We apply a panel of 331 microfinance institutions from 37 countries to investigate the relationship between social beliefs and microfinance financial performance. We find that microfinance institutions in countries with higher levels of trust and more collectivist culture have lower operating and default costs and charge lower interest rates. These results provide the first large cross-country evidence that social beliefs are important determinants of microfinance performance.
INTRODUCTION
Since the late 1980s, microfinance institutions (MFIs) have developed as a key way to solve the financial exclusion problem of poor people in developing countries, and the so-called 'microfinance revolution' quickly gained popularity around the world.
1 Both theory and empirical studies suggest that financial exclusion can hamper economic development and lead to persistent income inequality (Banerjee & Newman, 1993; Ray, 1998) . The major advantage of MFIs is thus to ensure easier access to credit services through the offering of small loans without monetary or physical collateral demands. Nevertheless, there is a substantial variation between countries in terms of the success and performance of MFIs (Armendáriz & Morduch, 2010; Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Morduch, 2007) .
Various cross-country studies have attempted to explain the uneven microfinance performances by differences in economic and organizational indicators, such as MFIs' legal status, regulation and corporate governance (Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Morduch, 2011; Hartarska & Nadolnyak, 2007; Mersland & Strøm, 2009; Roberts, 2013) . More recently, microfinance studies also started to take the impact of formal institutional arrangements into account These studies suggest that MFIs may perform better in countries where the traditional financial system is underdeveloped (Vanroose & D'Espallier, 2013) and where formal institutions are weak (Ahlin, Lin, & Maio, 2011) .
We take the analysis one step further and shift attention to informal arrangements. Because
MFIs imitate informal lending practices and rely strongly on personalised interactions and communal norms, their operations should be deeply embedded in a country's social and cultural context (Epstein & Yuthas, 2011) . Through the use of group lending and social collateral, microfinance is therefore likely to rely more on informal institutions such as trust rather than on the formal institutional environment. Building on this informal institutional perspective, we examine the role of social beliefs on MFIs' operational and financial performance across countries. To our knowledge, this study provides the first large crosscountry analysis of the impact of social beliefs on microfinance performance.
For the purpose of this study, we construct a dataset of 311 MFIs located in 37 countries based on the information provided by the Microfinance Information Exchange (MIX, 2012), which we complement with survey data on trust from the World Values Survey (WVS, 2012) and the Global Barometer Surveys (GBS, 2009) as well as the individualism versus collectivism index developed by Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov (2010) . To distinguish the impact of social beliefs from that of other factors, we select a large set of control variables based on previous studies and theoretical considerations.
We find evidence in support of our hypothesis that social beliefs affect MFIs' financial performance. Our results show that MFIs in countries with higher levels of trust have significantly lower default risks and charge lower interest rates. Moreover, a higher degree of collectivist cultural values is associated with significantly lower costs per borrower and costs per dollar loaned. Ancillary tests indicate that while the effect of collectivism is most significant for smaller MFIs, the positive correlation between trust and MFI financial performance holds for MFIs of all sizes.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In Chapter 2, we explain the relationship between MFI performance and social beliefs and develop our hypotheses. In Chapter 3, we describe the dataset and discuss the choice of variables. In Chapter 4, we present the methodology. In Chapter 5, we report the results on the relationship between MFI performance and social beliefs. Finally, Chapter 6 concludes the paper.
MICROFINANCE AND SOCIAL BELIEFS
The idea that informal institutions, such as culture, customs, beliefs, norms and religion, affect organizational performance is strongly supported by a wide range of theoretical and empirical studies (Ménard & Shirley, 2005; Williamson, 1998) . In our paper, we focus particularly on trust and collectivist cultural norms. Microfinance lending schemes rely on collective action, cooperation and coordination for mutual benefit, all of which depend strongly on reciprocity and trust (Beilmann & Realo, 2012) . We therefore conjecture that the level of trust as well as the degree of collectivist cultural norms, as features of communities and nations, should have a pivotal role in the development and performance of microfinance.
(a) Trust
Trust plays an important role in any type of financial exchange, and while formal contracts and legal regulations can serve as its substitute, they come at the expense of transaction costs (Howorth & Moro, 2012) . Because trust is present at multiple levels of interactions within microfinance relationships, both between borrowers and between borrowers and loan officers, its amount can critically affect the outcomes (Epstein & Yuthas, 2011) . MFIs can use trust to minimise the need for formal contracts and regulations and to serve as an alternative control mechanism. This allows an MFI to save money and resources on transaction and monitoring costs, to provide lower interest rates and, eventually, to fulfil its mission to offer financial services to the poorest and most disadvantaged clients.
Moreover, microfinance repayment relies on joint liability, social connections, informal networks and other features of informal group lending schemes, implying that MFIs operate in a credit market that relies on credible promises instead of formal collateral. Trust and social collateral, which encompasses borrowers' reputation and the social networks to which they belong, can solve problems of imperfect information and credible commitment (Karlan, Mobius, Rosenblat, & Szeidl, 2009; Keefer & Knack, 2005) . Peer pressure, joint liability and the threat of social sanctions can decrease the risks of opportunistic behaviour by contracting parties, while social connections between borrowers promote savings in screening and mutual monitoring (Bastelaer & Leathers, 2006) . Consequently, the higher the level of trust, the better the MFI performance should be.
Epstein and Yuthas (2011) develop a theoretical model that incorporates trust as an important determinant of MFI performance. The positive impact of higher levels of trust on MFI performance is explained by three main mechanisms. First, trust motivates borrowing group members to cooperate and to share information and resources, which increases loan repayment (Bastelaer & Leathers, 2006; Karlan, 2007) . Second, trust improves the sustainability of borrowing groups over time, thus decreasing the risk of default (McEvily, Perrone, & Zaheer, 2003) . Third, trust is necessary in order to form the relationship between loan officers and clients and for loan officers to obtain important information from clients, which in turn allows loan officers to charge lower interest rates (Uchida, Udell, & Yamori, 2012) .
Previous experimental and country-specific micro-level studies also suggest that social ties can reduce moral hazard behaviour within groups (for example, Hermes, Lensink, & Mehrteab, 2005, in Eritrea) and that clients with stronger social connections, a similar culture and higher trust tend to have higher repayment rates (Al-Azzam, Hill, & Sarengi, 2012, in Jordan; Bastelaer & Leathers, 2006, in Zambia; Cassar, Crowly, & Wydick, 2007, in South Africa and Armenia; Karlan, 2007, in Peru) . If such relationships exist on the micro level,
there is reason to believe that they should also be decisive in explaining variation in crosscountry comparisons of organizational performance.
Given the above-discussed benefits of higher trust, we propose the following hypothesis: 
(b) Collectivist cultural norms
Another important dimension of social beliefs is that of cultural variation, particularly the aspect of collectivist versus individualist cultural norms (Markus & Kitayama, 1991) . In more collectivist societies, individuals are more willing to subordinate their personal goals to collective ones and regard themselves as strongly connected with other members of the group.
In contrast, individuals in more individualistic societies see each other as autonomous beings pursuing their personal goals (Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002 ).
The sociocultural environment in which MFIs operate, which includes obligations, expectations, norms and self-imposed rules of conduct, can influence financial management and the choice of guarantors, thus affecting MFI lending practices. In a highly collectivist country, where obligations to the well-being of the extended family and kinship network are valued higher than the individual's private benefit, group welfare is part of the individual member's self-identity and reputation. As such, individuals in more collectivist countries not only work hard to repay their own debts but also encourage other group members to do the same (Gould, 2010).
Moreover, compared to individualist societies, collectivist societies rely more on informal institutions, which can allow MFIs to take better advantage of the existing informal environment. Collectivist cultural norms enhance the group's ability to use the threat of nonfinancial social and moral sanctions against the individual group member, which in turn should reduce moral hazard and lead to lower default rates in repayment (Greif, 1994 per cent, we find our sample very similar.
[ and provide information on 44 countries matching our MFI data, while the GBS (2009) provides data on 24 additional countries over the period 1995-2010. 6 The data are matched with available information on collectivism, which leaves us with 37 countries. Within this sample, the countries with the highest levels of trust are China (with an average trust score of 56 %), Pakistan (40 %), Vietnam (39 %) and Jordan (32 %), while Brazil (7 %), the Philippines (10 %), Kenya (10 %) and Tanzania (11 %) are the countries with the lowest trust scores (see Table Al Table Al in the Appendix).
The summary statistics of the social beliefs variables are presented in Table 2 , together with the description of the other country-specific variables used in the analysis.
[
TABLE 2] (c) Country-specific variables
In addition to social beliefs and MFI characteristics, we explore a large number of other variables used in the literature to explain cross-country variation in MFI performance.
Existing empirical research on MFIs suggests that their financial performance is related to the macroeconomic and institutional environment in which they operate (Ahlin et al. 2011 ). We use per capita economic growth and GDP per capita to account for a country's economic situation (as in Ahlin et al., 2011; Hartarska & Nadolnyak, 2007; Mersland et al., 2013) . (1999), we also obtain another aspect of culture, that is, the percentage of the population in each country belonging to different religious affiliations separated between Catholic, Protestant, Muslim and others. Finally, we investigate whether our measures of social beliefs could capture the general effect of poverty. As a proxy for poverty, we use the average levels of the poverty headcount ratio at 2 dollars per day, based on the WDI (World Bank, 2013).
9
The percentage of the population below the poverty line varies in our sample from less than 1 per cent in Russia to approximately 80 per cent in Tanzania. 
ESTIMATION METHODOLOGY

EMPIRICAL RESULTS (a) Baseline results of the impact of social beliefs on MFI performance
We first determine the appropriate model specification by testing for intra-cluster correlation using the Parente and Santos Silva (2013) test. The results of this test indicate that there is intra-cluster correlation. We therefore apply standard errors that are robust under heteroskedasticity and intra-cluster correlation. Table 3 presents the estimation results obtained from the quantile regression with robust standard errors clustered on MFI.
[ As shown in Table 3 , we find a significant negative correlation between trust and default risk.
That is, the fraction of actual loans at risk in MFI portfolios is significantly lower in countries where there is higher trust. Even though we control for the economic environment, rule of law and ethnic heterogeneity in our model specifications, there is still a possibility that our measure of generalised trust is not exogenous. To address this potential omitted variable bias, we also consider a larger set of control variables, including services, agriculture and manufacturing shares of GDP, inflation and population below the poverty line. We add each of these variables, one at a time, to our baseline specification. Moreover, we check for possible time effects by estimating our base model with added time dummies. For each specification, the negative correlation between generalised trust and MFIs' average interest rates and default costs remains statistically significant and of the similar order of magnitude. Similarly, the negative correlation between collectivism and operating costs remains statistically unaffected.
(b) Impact of social beliefs at different levels of the conditional distribution of MFI performance indicators
Quantile regression allows us to examine the role of social beliefs on performance indicators throughout their conditional distribution and thereby to extend our analysis from a median MFI to also cover the best-and worst-performing MFIs.
[ (2012), who find significant effects of trust on the performance of small banks, which are more similar to larger MFIs. Therefore, the size of an MFI is not the main determinant of the effectiveness of trust.
[ In contrast, collectivism clearly lowers the costs of smaller MFIs, while having no significant effect among larger MFIs (see Table 5 ). These results can be explained by cooperative norms being most effective for smaller groups or communities with long-standing relationships, where the sanctioning against violators of such norms is most severe, while trust can still play a significant role in more complex, multiple-network societies (Hechter & Opp, 2001 ).
(d) Impact of social beliefs on the performance of NGOs versus banking institutions
In our baseline results, we control for the effect of legal status by including institutional type dummies (see Table 3 ). To determine whether our results hold for more specific groups of MFIs, we distinguish between NGOs, which are typically not regulated by a banking supervisory agency, and more formal, supervised banking institutions (banks and NBFIs).
[ Table 6 reports the results of these split-sample regressions. Our findings indicate that the two organizational types of MFIs benefit from social norms in somewhat different ways. While both NGOs and banking institutions have better repayment rates thanks to higher trust, only banking institutions benefit from trust in terms of lowered interest rates. For NGOs, collectivism is associated with lower interest rates instead. As such, we find that more institutionalised organizations such as banks benefit more from trust, while NGOs rely more on collectivism, which seems reasonable given the more informal nature of NGOs compared to banking institutions.
(e) Impact of social beliefs with alternative formal institutional variables
When we control for trust and collectivist cultural norms, a 'good' formal institutional environment as proxied by the rule of law does not seem to play a significant role in the financial performance of MFIs. This result is consistent with those of Ahlin et al. (2011) In contrast to Ahlin et al. (2011), we do not find any negative effects of formal institutional quality on MFI performance. In fact, these correlations only hold when social beliefs are not controlled. Once we include them in our analysis, the negative effects of the formal institutional setting on MFI performance disappear. Moreover, the beneficial effects of social beliefs on MFI performance remain significant under all alternative specifications.
(f) Impact of social beliefs including historical heritage
Recent studies stress the importance of colonial experience on current institutions (Beck et al., 2003a; Acemoglu et al., 2001; La Porta et al., 1999) . In particular, colonization policies adopted by colonizing European countries depended on the conditions in the colonies and left long-lasting effects on the quality of institutions in now-independent states. The argument is that the colonizers created better institutions in environments in which they could settle safely.
To explore the importance of this historical aspect, we control for extractive institutions using the logarithm of settler mortality as a proxy.
[ Indeed, if we include the interaction term between trust and settler mortality, we find that the more extractive the institutions are, the more trust lowers MFI costs, which is significant at the 5 per cent level. 16 In an alternative specification, we control for political heritage by including dummies for legal origin and find the effects of social beliefs significant and of similar magnitude as in the baseline results (see Table 9 ).
[ 
(g) Impact of social beliefs including economic freedom and country income groups
We further investigate if our results hold when we take the development of market institutions and the current economic situation into account. To control for the degree of economic freedom, we include a dummy indicating repressed, or 'mostly unfree,' economies, which we base on the Index of Economic Freedom 2010 (Heritage Foundation, 2013) . The results are presented in Table 10 .
[ These results are presented in Table 11 .
[ Social beliefs continue to exert significant favourable influence on MFI performance, with only the effect of collectivism on the cost per dollar loaned being weakened, yet not eliminated. Similarly, the exclusion of the four countries with the highest shares of Christian populations does not qualitatively affect the results. 
CONCLUSION
Despite microfinance's strong similarity to informal, relationship-based lending and its deep embeddedness in social and cultural contexts, there has been little empirical analysis of the effects of social beliefs on MFI performance. To address this gap in the literature, we employ a dataset of 331 MFIs from 37 countries and combine it with cross-country survey data on trust and collectivism.
We find that social beliefs help explain the observed differences in the financial performance of MFIs over the investigated period, 2003-2011, even when the economic environment, quality of formal institutions, historical factors and ethnic fractionalization are taken into account. Our results show that there is a negative and statistically significant relationship between the level of trust in a country and MFIs' average interest rates and default costs. We also find a significant, negative relationship between collectivist cultural norms and MFIs' operating costs.
The evidence in this paper indicates that social beliefs have s significant effect on MFIs'
performance, allowing them to save on monitoring and default costs and to offer lower interest rates to their clients. This is consistent with the idea that MFIs are able to take advantage of a society's higher level of trust and stronger collectivist cultural norms, which improve cooperation and increase the within-group sense of responsibility and to use them as viable substitutes for traditional, formal institutions.
Our findings provide further insights for MFI development across countries. First, MFI financial performance not only relies on the macroeconomic and formal institutional environment, as the current empirical literature suggests, but is also closely related to social beliefs, particularly trust and norms of cooperation. Therefore, the informal institutional setting in which an MFI is situated should be taken into account when evaluating MFI performance. Second, social beliefs are more important to MFI performance than the formal institutional setting, and more formal institutions are not necessarily detrimental to MFI performance if the informal setting is taken into account. This result can explain the negative effect of good regulations and government on MFI performance found by Ahlin et al. (2011 Note: The sample consists of data from 37 countries. We require each country in our sample to have a score on trust and collectivism. Table 3 ). 
APPENDIX
